Quatloos! :: View topic - 861 non-withholding employers file fake liens: "Defendants have provided no evidence demonstrating that the UCC Financing Statement is based on legitimate debt or law, or controverting the facts set forth above. Rather, defendants have provided documents that appear to have been created by defendants, none of which were adjudicated in a court of law. It appears defendants claim that a debt arose as a result of the failure of the employees to respond when defendants mailed documents to them. However, the courts do not recognize the legality of such a 'lien.' United States v. Andra, 923 F.Supp. 157, 159-60 (D. Idaho 1996). Defendants have not provided any evidence of a contractual or other legal relationship with any IRS employee to establish the validity of the UCC Financing Statement filed by defendants. "

Quatloos! :: View topic - 861 non-withholding employers file fake liens: "Defendants have provided no evidence demonstrating that the UCC Financing Statement is based on legitimate debt or law, or controverting the facts set forth above. Rather, defendants have provided documents that appear to have been created by defendants, none of which were adjudicated in a court of law. It appears defendants claim that a debt arose as a result of the failure of the employees to respond when defendants mailed documents to them. However, the courts do not recognize the legality of such a 'lien.' United States v. Andra, 923 F.Supp. 157, 159-60 (D. Idaho 1996). Defendants have not provided any evidence of a contractual or other legal relationship with any IRS employee to establish the validity of the UCC Financing Statement filed by defendants. "

CLLA Creditors' Rights Section Newsletter: "Debtor Abuses
A couple of frequent hot issues are still important to you when a debtor files a defense utilizing arguments and forms bought or acquired from a Web site.
a. Copyrighting
Debtor claims in a written communication/notification or in a defense or counterclaim that he/she has obtained a copyright on their name and that you have violated the copyright but using their name in collection letters or writings involved in litigation. The debtor may bring action against your client and firm for the alleged violations.
Be aware that a personal name is not protected by state or federal trademark statutes unless the name is used in a commercial manner. Section 102 of the Copyright Act protects 'original works of authorship.' Absent is any case law that establishes liability for the use of a person�s name in a non-commercial setting.
b. Arbitrations
Another popular debtor scam occurs when debtors notify you in writing or as a defense during litigation of an allegedly obtained 'Arbitration Award.' Debtors/money protesters then file bogus UCC-1 financing statements against your client or your firm.
Such arbitrations are void for lack of due process and lack of jurisdiction. For case references to assist you in your research, you can refer to Citibank ( South Dakota), N.A. v. American Arbitration Forum, et al., Case No. 02-8143, Hillsborough County, Florida (an arbitration forum was enjoined from issuing awards). See also, Citibank ( South Dakota), N.A. v. Southeast Arbitration Service, et al., Case No. 02-1902-CA-G, Marion County, Florida (a temporary injunction restrained the issuing of arbitration awards).
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and many state Uniform Arbitration Acts allow for an action to vacate an award, after it has been entered. Consider "

More Court Cases:

Fifth Third Bank v. Jones-Williams Identified as a debt elimination scam. "

{¶ 6} Appellee filed a “Sur-Reply” in support of its motion for summary judgment on February 19, 2004. Therein, appellee argued appellants misapplied the law to the facts of the instant matter. In support of its Sur-Reply, appellee attached a notice from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System regarding debt elimination scams.{¶ 7} On March 16, 2004, appellants propounded their requests for production of documents and interrogatories on appellee. On April 5, 2004, pursuant to Civ.R. 26(C), appellee moved the court for a protective order with respect to appellants' requested discovery. Appellee argued that completing the requested discovery would be unduly burdensome. Appellants subsequently filed a motion to compel discovery, arguing appellee failed to show good cause why the court should grant the motion for a protective order. The court granted appellee's motion for a protective order and denied appellants' motion to compel. Relying on Civ.R. 26(C), the court found that requiring appellee to answer the requested discovery would be “annoying” and “unduly burdensome” because it was “clear” from the interrogatories that appellants either did not understand the law or accounting, or were attempting to deflect attention from the underlying debt."


Pierce v. Ocwen Loan Servicing
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 1994571
M.D.N.C.,2006.

Indeed, the court agrees with Defendant that the drafts submitted by Plaintiff appear to be products of a fraudulent, debt-elimination scheme. ( See Def.'s Exs. I, J; Pierce Aff., Ex. A) Under this type of scheme, debtors submit authentic-looking, but fake, documents to lenders and loan servicers such as Defendant in an attempt to avoid legitimate debt. ( See Def.'s Ex. I, OCC Alert 2003-12, October 1, 2003 (posting a warning about and describing the debt-elimination schemes)) Under such a “debt-elimination scheme,” an internet site or other advertisement offers to sell a document to a purchaser to “legally” eliminate an outstanding credit card balance or other debt. Often these programs will make false claims about the Federal Reserve System, U.S. currency, or other federal or state government programs as legal justification for the debt-elimination program. ( See Def.'s Ex. I, FDIC Consumer News Mem., Winter 2003/2004) (warning consumers about bogus debt-elimination scams)) Thus, in return for a significant fee on the total debt owed, debtors “receive an official-looking, but worthless, piece of paper purporting to be a ‘certified draft,’ drawn on a fictitious financial institution, with a face value equal to the debt owed.” United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 85 (2nd Cir.1997); see also United States v. Adamson, Nos. 94-30195, 94-30196, 1995 WL 353816, at *1 (9th Cir. June 12, 1995) (unpublished). The debtor then submits the drafts to the creditor and requests return of any collateral or evidence of indebtedness. Jacobs, 117 F.3d at 85. The creditor accepts the drafts but, according to sound banking practices, declines to release the collateral until the draft clears, which never happens. Id. Thus, the creditor loses the expense of attempting to collect on the draft, and the debtor loses the fee he paid for the worthless document. Id.

The second count of Plaintiff's amended complaint re-alleges much of what is alleged in Count One, but with a bit of a twist. In support of this claim, Plaintiff alleges that he entered into a written contract with Defendants in which he “sold” Defendant a “deposit” in the amount of $185,600. (Am. Compl. at 3, ¶ 3) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant is in breach of contract for accepting Plaintiff's “payment” and then later refusing it and charging interest on the monthly payments. (Am. Compl. at 4, ¶¶ 5, 6) This claim is baseless

The third count alleges that Defendant violated the Truth In Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. In support of this claim, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants prepared the note and mortgage agreements in writing, but failed to disclose a material fact in either instrument. The material fact was the Plaintiff was the depositor and that the Defendants neither risked any of its assets in this exchange, nor any assets of other depositors.” (Am. Compl. at 4, ¶ 5) The court finds that these allegations do not state a claim against Defendant for a violation of TILA.

Pierce v. Ocwen Loan Servicing
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 1994571
M.D.N.C.,2006.
Deals with "generally accepted accounting principles" and attempt to pay a debt by issuing a new note.

http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL230000pub/newsletter/0002/materials/20041102000000.pdf#search=%22bogus%20arbitration%22

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
by Eric Mogilnicki
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, LLP
Eric Mogilnicki of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, LLP made a presentation to the ADR
Subcommittee regarding the recent proliferation of bogus arbitration providers. Facilitated by
Internet websites and e-mail solicitations, a growing number of "debt elimination experts" are
luring consumers into arbitration schemes purporting to eliminate their credit card and other debt
obligations. See, e.g., http://debteliminationexperts.com/homepage.php. In return for payments
of hundreds or thousands of dollars, these "experts" promise to provide immediate relief from
banks and creditors, eliminate or drastically reduce debts, restore credit ratings, and transform
debts into monies owed to the borrower.
The arbitration schemes operate by first sending "change of terms" notices purporting to add an
arbitration clause to the debt agreement or designating a new arbitration forum. The forum,
which typically lacks a street address and rules, in turn issues an "award" declaring the debt
unenforceable. In many cases, the ruling also finds that the consumer is owed the dollar amount
of the loan as a penalty for unlawful activity. Courts have refused to enforce the bogus awards,
but the schemes often push already financially vulnerable consumers toward bankruptcy by
wasting money and time while their debts continue to accrue interest and fees. At the end of the
process, consumers may have judgments entered against them for attorney’s fees and the original
debt.
Some lenders report receiving more than a thousand change of terms notices in the last year, and
one bank received more than 4,000. Lenders can combat the problem by warning their customer
service representatives to be on the look out for such notices, tracking them closely, responding
quickly to dissuade customers from participation, and challenging the awards through litigation.
As this problem grows, we expect that the Federal Trade Commission, state Attorneys General,
and other government agencies will begin to take action against these schemes.

Bogus Arbitration and other Debt Elimination matters discussed.

McGlinchey Stafford

Bogus Fair Credit Billing DefenseTHE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Rockingham Superior Court
PO Box 1258
Kingsron. NH 03848 1258
603 642-5256

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS. SUPERIOR COURT

CITIBANK (S. DAKOTA), N.A.
v.
PAUL G. ARG****

Docket No: 03 -C593

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On May 22, 2003, the plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against the defendant in the Derry District Court. It alleged that the defendant had failed to pay for credit extended to him by the plaintiff on his Master Card. Upon receipt of the Writ of Summons, the defendant removed the case to the Rockingham County Superior Court and demanded a jury trial.
The principal amount of the debt claimed by the plaintiff is $9,129.62.

Upon the case being filed here, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The motion alleged that there was no dispute as to the facts in the case and that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Attached to the motion was an affidavit signed by an employee of the plaintiff acknowledging that she had researched the defendant's account and determined that he had charged certain purchases on his Master Card for the purpose of obtaining goods and services, that credit was extended to the defendant by the plaintiff and that he refused to reimburse the plaintiff pursuant to his contract with Citibank.

The defendant objected to the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. First, he points to the fact that he alerted the plaintiff to what he termed a "billing error" by letter dated March l8, 2003. He argues that the letter was never responded to. Secondly, the defendant claims that he is not indebted to the plaintiff because it is the plaintiff that breached the contract that he had with Citibank. He claims that the plaintiff has never proven that it was "at risk" with respect to his credit card purchases. Therefore, the plaintiff has not suffered any monetary loss. On August 25, 2003, Judge Perkins of this court reviewed the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and the defendant's response. He issued the following order:
"Schedule the motion for hearing. It appears probable that the defendant's defense has no merit. If after hearing it is determined that the defendant is advancing a legal theory that has no merit, in bad faith, the Court will consider a legal fee and costs award to the plaintiff."

A hearing was held on the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment before this Court on September 17, 2003. The Court gave the defendant ample opportunity to explain why he is not indebted to the plaintiff for failure to pay his credit card balance. The defendant offered some generalities as to credit card companies and how they operate. He did not specifically deny that he used his credit card to obtain goods and services from retailers nor did he deny that he failed to reimburse Citibank for those purchases. He offered no evidence to suggest that the balance due as- claimed by the plaintiff was inaccurate. His "billing error" letter of March 8, 2003 is completely unintelligible.

The defendant filed an affidavit from someone named Todd-Ellis; Swanson (sic) who is alleged to be a certified public accountant residing in Greenville, South Carolina. A review of this multi-paged document suggests that the affiant espouses "voodoo economics." If the subject matter were not so serious, the affidavit would have to be considered laughable. Its reasoning is akin to a current astronomer offering evidence to prove that the world is flat. The Court rejects the affidavit out-of-hand.

The plaintiff indicated to the Court that the defendant had been a Citibank customer for many years and had always paid his debt in a timely fashion. When asked to explain the defendant's decision to stop paying for his credit card expenditures, plaintiff's counsel stated that in the recent past some of its customers had used the same strained logic to avoid paying a legitimate debt. He referred to this group of individuals as "monetary protesters."

The evidence submitted to the Court suggests that the credit card procedure used in this case is similar to most other credit card procedures. The defendant went to several providers of goods and services and used his credit card to obtain those goods and services for which he received full benefit. When it came time to reimburse his credit card company, who had initially paid the retailers, the defendant refused to acknowledge the debt. Although he has had ample opportunity to raise a legitimate defense by claiming that he did not get the goods and services alleged to have been provided or that he in fact paid for those goods and services, he has been unable to produce any evidence to refute the debt.
The Court therefore concludes that the defendant has acted in bad faith in this case.

If the defendant used his credit card to obtain goods, never intending to repay the plaintiff, then in fact he has committed a crime. RSA 637:3 provides, "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof."-

Upon review of all of the pleadings in this case, and as a result of the hearing held, the Court GRANTS the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. It finds and rules that the primary debt is $9,129.62. The plaintiff submitted an affidavit and request that it be awarded attorney fees as a result of the defendant's bad faith, and the Court finds the award suggested by the plaintiff is more than fair. The amount sought is $1,137.50. The plaintiff also is entitled to be reimbursed for the expenses of filing the lawsuit and to interest. Those additions bring the amount of the debt to $10,452.75.

In addition to said amount, the Court finds that because of the defendant's bad faith, plaintiff's counsel is entitled to be reimbursed for having to travel from his office in White River Junction, Vermont, to the Rockingham County Superior Court for a hearing on the motion. The Court adds the sum of $750 in attorney fees for that unnecessary expense. Accordingly, the Court finds and rules that the defendant is currently indebted to the plaintiff in the total sum of $11,202.75.

The plaintiff has two options if it wishes to satisfy its judgment in full. It can either levy on any assets that the defendant has in New Hampshire or it can file a motion with the Court requesting that a hearing be held to- determine the defendant's ability to pay the debt. Should such a hearing be necessary, the defendant will be required to file an affidavit with the Court with a complete listing of his assets and liabilities, after which the Court will determine how the debt is to be paid.

So ordered.

September 22, 2003
KENNETH R. McHUGH, Presiding Justice

THE ALL CAPS DEFENSE

Idiot Legal Arguments Section Four: "Objections to name printed in block letters (all-caps): US v. Lindbloom (WD Wash unpub 4/16/97) 79 AFTR2d 2578, 97 USTC para 50650; Braun v. Stotts (D Kan unpub 6/19/97) aff�d (10th Cir unpub 2/4/98); Jaeger v. Dubuque County (ND Iowa 1995) 880 F.Supp 640 at 643 ('The court finds Jaeger�s arguments concerning capitalization otherwise specious. The court routinely capitalizes the names of all parties before this court in all matters, civil and criminal, without any regard to their corporate or individual status....'; crank's reference to a law dictionary's definition of 'capitalize' -- as a financial term -- was completely misdirected); Vos v. Boyle (WD Mich unpub 4/11/95); Liebig v. Kelley-Allee (EDNC 1996) 923 F.Supp 778; Boyce v. CIR (9/25/96) TC Memo 1996-439 aff�d (9th Cir 1997) 122 F3d 1069; Smith v. Kitchen (10th Cir 1997) 156 F3d 1025, 97 USTC para 50107; US v. J.F. Heard (ND WV 1996) 952 F.Supp 329; J. Napier v. Jonas (WD Mich unpub 2/10/95); Wacker v. Crow (10th Cir unpub 7/1/99); Rosenheck & Co. Inc. v. US ex rel IRS & Kostich (ND Okla unpub 4/9/97) 79 AFTR2d 2715 (court explicitly found that perp was the same person as his name typed in all-caps and without punctuation); ('claims because his name is in all capital letters on the summons, he is not subject to the summons. ... completely without merit, patently frivolous, and will be rejected without expending any more of this court's resources') Russell v. US (WD Mich 1997) 969 F.Supp 24; US v. Klimek (ED Penn 1997) 952 F.Supp 1100 (tried to refuse all pleadings and court pa"

Can you stop militia pleadings? Perhaps, the Courts can sometimes restrict pleadings that a party can file. This is the start of some research. Strike Militia Pleadings?

Fighting Bogus Arbitration. This is a fantistic article. Replying to various arbitration forums. Tactics explained. Does this sound like "Blue Ridge Arbitration"? You be the judge.